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NOTES
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Henderson was correct in
holding that the deceased declarant of the excited utterance
should be susceptible to impeachment and discrediting in the
same manner as other witnesses, so far as such a process is
feasible. However, impeachment should not be allowed simply
because the excited utterance is "testimonial," if it is testi-
mony of an entirely different character from traditional testi-
mony. The true nature of the excited utterance compels its own
justification for permitting impeachment. A defendant who has
already lost the fundamental right to confront his accuser be-
cause of the accuser's death should not be further impositioned
by being denied the opportunity to discredit that witness whose
testimony is used against him.
Allen M. Posey, Jr.
ON WASHING DIRTY LINEN IN PUBLIC: PRIVACY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The defendant erected a bulletin board in his washateria
on which he posted pictures of the plaintiff taking money from
a soft drink machine five months earlier with captions detailing
the plaintiff's identity and subsequent conviction. About fif-
teen months later, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the
publicity constituted undue harassment which had caused him
great humiliation and embarrassment. The trial court agreed,
enjoined the defendant from giving further publicity to the
incident in any manner, and awarded damages in the amount
a chance to explain his inconsistencies. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 37, at 72. A
strict adherence to the foundation requirement in the case of an absent hearsay declar-
ant has been described as being tantamount to a sacrifice of "substance of proof to
orderliness of procedure, and the rights of the living party to consideration of the
deceased witness." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 260 (1895) (Shiras, J.,
dissenting). Professor Wigmore has voiced the concern that requiring a strict adherence
to the foundation requirement in the case of an absent hearsay declarant would result
in a simultaneous deprivation of the impeacher's two most potent modes of defense,
those of cross examination and impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. 3A J.
WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 1033, at 1037-38. He concludes that requiring a strict
compliance in the case of an absent hearsay declarant would be pushing the rule too
far. 3A J. WiGMORE, supra note 28, § 1033, at 1037-38. This appears to be the prevailing
view in most jurisdictions today. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 37, at 74.
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of $500. In affirming the trial court, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the defendant's conduct constituted an ac-
tionable invasion of the plaintiff's right to privacy and was not
within the protection of the rights of free speech and press.
Norris v. King, 355 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).'
The right to privacy has been invoked in widely divergent
contexts,' making general definitions difficult to apprehend. It
most simply designates the right to be let alone.' The court in
Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.4 stated that
privacy encompasses the right to live one's life in seclusion
without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired public-
ity, and to live without unwairanted interference by the public
in matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.'
The notion of privacy is capsuled in the following definition:
"Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others."6
Because the definitions of the right to privacy are so vague,
cover so many different interests, and arise in such varied con-
texts, attempts have been made to subdivide the different
kinds of invasion included. Due principally to the influence of
William L. Prosser,' a complex of four distinct torts has been
recognized: appropriation, intrusion, public disclosure of pri-
vate facts, and false light.8 Because of the common features of
1. Cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 596 (1978).
2. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right to Privacy Consistent With Fair and Effec-
tive Law Enforcement?, 23 KAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1974).
3. "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity:
to be let alone." T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (1879). This is the apparent, source of
the phrase.
4. 82 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955)."
5. Id. at 63.
6. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
7. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
8. The following definitions were officially adopted by the American Law Insti-
tute's Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1977:
§ 652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.
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the four torts, the defendant's actions may give the plaintiff
several grounds for recovery For example, if A breaks and
enters B's home, steals a photograph of B, and publishes it to
advertise his whiskey, together withfalse statements about B
that would be highly objectionable to a reasonable man, B has
grounds to recover under each of the four tort classifications.'°
Louisiana has had a long and full tradition of judicial con-
cern for these privacy interests." A cursory glance at several
cases reveals the breadth of protected privacy interests in
Louisiana and illustrates that each of the four torts gives rise
§ 652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
§ 652D. Publicity Given to Private Life
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publi-
cized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity
of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652E (1977).
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 814.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, comment d, Illus. 1 (1977).
11. In Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297 (La. 1811), the court enjoined the
defendant from publishing with indecent commentary, a letter the plaintiff had sent
to a third party. This was almost eighty years before Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis published their famous article calling for recognition of the right to privacy as a
separate entity. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Express recognition of the right to privacy soon followed in Louisiana. See Schulman
v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39
So. 499 (1905). The court in both cases found that the right to be let alone protected a
person not yet convicted from having his picture placed in a rogues' gallery. See
generally F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE § 191 in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 247
(1977); Comment, The Right of Privacy in Louisiana, 28 LA. L. REV. 469 (1968).
Express recognition of the right to privacy is also found in article 1, section 5, of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 which provides in part: "Every person shall be secure
in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy."
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to a cause of action. Thus for example, when plaintiff's fellow
employees entered his dwelling without permission, the court
found an actionable intrusion upon his privacy."2 Likewise,
appropriation of a person's picture to advertise the benefits of
a health club triggered liability although the plaintiff had given
consent ten years earlier. 3 Disclosure of color photographs of
an employee's wounds at a company safety meeting without his
permission has also been proscribed." Finally, a lawyer com-
plaining that radio advertisements indicated that he was cur-
rently selling used cars, recovered because this publicity placed
him in a false light. 5
A person's right to privacy is not absolute, however. The
United States Supreme Court noted in Time, Inc. v. Hill" that
"Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomi-
tant of life in a civilized community."' 7 Louisiana courts have
applied a test of reasonableness to determine actionable inva-
sions of privacy. 8 Under such a test, a person may lawfully
invade the privacy of another, but he may not seriously and
unreasonably interfere with this right without the imposition
of liability. 9
When the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publica-
tion of information, as in disclosure and false light cases, the
claims of privacy directly confront the constitutional freedoms
of speech and press.20 Thus, a compromise developed between
the two at common law, principally in the defamation area,
resulting in a limited privilege to speak about matters concern-
ing public figures or of public interest.2 ' Beginning especially
12. Love v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972).
13. McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
14. Lambert v. Dow Chemical Co., Inc., 215 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
15. Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., 296 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
16. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
17. Id. at 388.
18. Comment, supra note 11, at 477. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Securities Inv. Co.
of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1960); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909, 913 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963). Accord, Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321
(1961).
19. Comment, supra note 11, at 471.
20. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
21. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 7, at 410. This privilege has been termed that
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with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," this limited privilege 3
has been broadened in scope and given constitutional status. 24
This development in defamation was carried over into privacy
actions by Time, Inc. v. Hill, which applied to false light cases
the New York Times standard of "knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard as to whether the statement was false or not.' '25
In Time, Inc., a magazine story about the opening of a play
misleadingly indicated that the play accurately portrayed an
incident in which the plaintiffs had been involved. The Court
reversed the lower court's judgment for the plaintiffs and re-
manded for application of this rigorous new standard. Some
protection of false speech has been deemed necessary to give
the vital "breathing space" in which beneficial dialogue may
flourish.26
Truthful speech is involved in wrongful disclosure and has
likewise received increasing protection.27 The United States
Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn2 1 indicated
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments command noth-
ing less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the
publication of truthful information contained in official court
records open to public inspection. 29 The defendant's reporter
of fair comment.
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. The Court held that a public official having his public conduct defamed was
constitutionally required to show knowledge that the statement was false or reckless
disregard as to the falsity on the part of the defendant in order to recover. The concern
was that the fear of large damage awards would chill the legitimate dissemination of
useful information. 376 U.S. at 278.
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819. He called this broadening unquestionably
the greatest victory won by defendants in the modem history of the law of torts. Id.
25. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the
Court held in part that the New York Times standard need not be applied to a private
plaintiff in a defamation action. No case has yet indicated whether this lesser standard
is available to a private plaintiff in a false light action; in Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court declined to resolve this issue.
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
27. Indeed, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts felt compelled to
note that liability for giving publicity to true statements may not be consistent with
the free-speech and free-press provisions of the first amendment. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652D, Special Note (1977).
28. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
29. Id. at 495.
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had obtained the name of a deceased rape victim from official
court records, and the information was subsequently broadcast
despite a Georgia statute prohibiting such publicity29 The
Court considered the key interest to be the press's role in in-
forming the public of the operations of government." Cox
Broadcasting was reaffirmed in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court32 in which the Court unanimously and summa-
rily set aside a state court pretrial order enjoining members of
the media from publishing the name or picture of a juvenile
involved in a pending delinquency proceeding. The reporters
had obtained the person's name at an earlier detention hearing
which could have been closed under state law but had not been
so closed.
In Cox the Court left open the question of whether a state
may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from truth-
ful, but unwanted publicity in the press. 3 Justice Powell in his
concurring opinion in Cox stated that he believed Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc." required that truth be recognized as a
complete defense in a defamation action for harm to one's rep-
utation, but that causes of action grounded in a state's desire
to protect privacy generally implicated different interests and
allowed a different constitutional balance to be struck. 35
In Norris v. King the Third Circuit Court of Appeal faced
this task of balancing the plaintiff's interest in privacy against
the defendant's interest in free speech. The plaintiff had stolen
between $25 and $50 from the defendant's soft drink machine.
The defendant made various attempts to recover this money,
including several telephone conversations with the plaintiff's
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
31. This sentiment is shared by Alexander Meiklejohn, who stated that "the self-
education of a self-governing public" is the core value protected by the first. amend-
ment. Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234, 263
(1966). Justice Brandeis articulated additional interests promoted by free speech: it is
necessary for the success of a democratic society because it provides a safety valve to
relieve unrest and allows peaceful change; it is an end in itself, promotive of the self-
fulfillment of the individual. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
32. 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
33. 420 U.S. at 491.
34. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
35. 420 U.S. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring).
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mother and his attorney. Roughly five months after the plain-
tiff had pleaded guilty to theft, the defendant erected a bulletin
board on which he posted pictures of the plaintiff taken by a
hidden security camera. Captions under the pictures informed
the viewer of the plaintiff's name and address, with a some-
what insulting commentary designed to warn potential offend-
ers that detection was certain and conviction likely.3" Viewing
these facts from the perspective of the debtor-creditor relation-
ship, the majority held that the defendant's conduct consti-
tuted undue harassment and coercion directed at restitution. 7
The court emphasized the manner and duration of the expo-
sure.18 Furthermore, it considered the defendant's rights of free
speech and press to be less weighty than those of members of
the media who have constitutional responsibilities to keep the
public informed."
Since a debtor-creditor relationship resulted from the
plaintiff's theft, the court's decision relied heavily on the strong
line of creditor-coercion cases within the larger body of privacy
cases in Louisiana juriprudence. 0 Under the jurisprudence, a
creditor may take reasonable steps to collect debts legally
due," but any high-pressure tactics, coercion, or outrageous
36. Norris v. King, 355 So. 2d 21, 22 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). The commentary
read in part:
HMMMM . .. HERE WE HAVE MICHAEL NORRIS OF RT. 1 BOX
556, PINEVILLE, LOUISIANA. MICHAEL IS CAREFUL-HE WANTS TO
BE SURE NO ONE IS WATCHING!
WOW ... MICHAEL IS SWIFT-IF HE RUNS FAST ENOUGH
WHILE HOLDING THE MONEY BOX WITH BOTH HANDS-MAYBE HE
WON'T GET CAUGHT.
TOO BAD . .. MICHAEL ISN'T FASTER THAN OUR CAMERAS!
AND MICHAEL ISN'T FASTER THAN THE POLICE! MICHAEL PAYS
THE COURT $105.00 MICHAEL GETS 91 DAYS IN JAIL (suspended) MI-
CHAEL MUST REPORT TO A PROBATION OFFICER FOR 1 YEAR MI-
CHAEL NOW HAS A POLICE RECORD.
Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 24-25.
40. See, e.g., Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919); Booty v. Ameri-
can Fin. Corp. of Shreveport, 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); Boudreaux v.
Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d
909 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
41. Comment, supra note 11, at 472.
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conduct on his part will render his activities actionable.42 The
grounds for recovery in these cases are in part based on the
torts of intrusion and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress,4" which overlap to provide the debtor with a potent
counter-weapon against abusive collection methods." In order
to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, one
must generally show extreme outrage and serious harm. How-
ever, as Prosser notes, "once 'privacy' gets into the picture, and
the fact of the intrusion is added," such proof "apparently [is]
no longer required."4 5
In Norris the defendant had requested the trial judge to
order restitution at the time the plaintiff was sentenced for the
theft conviction, but the judge declined, explaining that resti-
tution was a civil matter." When asked why he did not pursue
a civil remedy, the defendant explained that the small amount
did not justify-civil proceedings. 7 The defendant also declined
to accept a compromise offer to settle for $25. The majority
viewed the defendant's subsequent actions as a resort to self-
help which improperly ignored the remedy provided by law.4
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 57. Comment, Collection Capers: Liability for
Debt Collection Practices, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 572, 584 (1957). See, e.g., Norris v.
Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 177, 132 So. 2d 321, 323 (1961); Guthridge v. Pen-
Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 713 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Booty v. American Fin. Corp. of
Shreveport, 224 So. 2d 512, 516 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909,
913 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
43. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) defines the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in part as follows: "One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to an-
other is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm."
An early Louisiana case illustrating this type conduct is Nickerson v. Hodges, 146
La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920)(often referred to as the "pot of gold" case). See also Gadbury
v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925). The defendant was a mortician who refused
to cremate the body of the deceased son of the plantiff until a prior disputed debt was
paid in full.
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 57.
45. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 7, at 422.
46. Norris v. King, 355 So. 2d 21, 29 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
47. Id.
48. Strong sentiment against such practices can be inferred from the numerous
cases in which the debtor successfully recovered from the creditor; the large amounts
of the awards, especially at the trial level; and the recent legislative action in this area
on both the state and federal level. See, e.g., Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So.
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Several telephone calls were made by the defendant to the
plaintiff's mother and his attorney. The plaintiff's mother tes-
tified that the defendant had threatened to erect the bulletin
board if restitution were not made, conduct which clearly
would be coercive under the jurisprudence." The dissenting
judge, however, forcefully argued that coercion was not sup-
ported by the record and that the creditor-debtor rationale of
the majority was misapplied."
265 (1919)($32.75 debt owed, $500 awarded); Booty v. American Fin. Corp. of Shreve-
port, 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969)($991 debt owed, jury awarded over $20,000
which was reduced by the trial judge to $7,500); Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217
So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968)($185 debt owed by husband and wife, $1800
awarded to each, reduced to $500 apiece on appeal); Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963)(failure to settle a disputed debt cost plantiff his job, $5000
awarded); Quina v. Robert's, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944)($1.45 debt owed,
$100 awarded). Cf. Love v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1972)(plantiff lost his job with the defendant due in part to the intrusion of
defendant's employees, awarded $15,000); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
82 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955)(not a creditor-coercion case, but the jury awarded
$12,500 for the unauthorized use of plantiff's name by his insurer, reduced on appeal
to $3,000).
See also LA. R.S. 9:3562 (Supp. 1972)(Louisiana Consumer Credit Law)(lists un-
authorized collection practices but the section is not to limit a debtor's right to bring
an action for damages provided by article 2315); Fair Debt Collection Practice Act §
806, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (1977) which provides:
A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of
which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection
of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the follow-
ing conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The use or threat of use of violence
or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of
any person.
(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural conse-
quence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.
(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts,
except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements
of section 1681(a)(f) or 1681(b)(3) of this title.
(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.
(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversa-
tion repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any per-
son at the called number.
(6) Except as provided in section 1692(b) of this title, the placement of tele-
phone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity.
49. For example, in Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919), similar
threats to humiliate the debtor through public exposure were made to recover the
$32.75 debt-resulting in a $500 damage award.
50. 355 So. 2d at 28-30 (Hood, J., dissenting). Judge Hood pointed out that the
1979] 1219
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Even if the majority's factual findings are accepted, it is
likely that the defendant's conduct apart from the erection of
the bulletin board was insufficient to support recovery by the
plaintiff. The majority pointed to this conduct, however, to
support its finding that the defendant was motivated in this
actionable publicity by a desire to coerce and harass the plain-
tiff. The bulletin board was seen as an unreasonable debt
collection device and served as one more manifestation of the
defendant's improper motivation."
The line of debt collection cases gives the debtor some
protection from a creditor's attempts to force payment by mak-
ing the indebtedness known to the public. The traditional view
is that a creditor's giving publicity to a debt is actionable, even
though the debt is undisputed.52 The notion underlying these
cases is that a private debt is not a legitimate concern of the
public and that the law provides a remedy to the creditor which
he is expected to exercise in lieu of self-help. The debtor may
continue to be protected from publicity concerning the debt,
even if it is reduced to judgment and thus a matter of public
record .
Applicability of these debt collection cases to the instant
bulletin board cost more than the debt owed and that pictures of two individuals who
were not indebted to the defendant were just as prominently displayed. Also, no de-
mand for payment was made at any time after the bulletin board was erected. Id.
51. "It appears obvious, from the record, that one of defendant's motives in
displaying plaintiff's picture in defendant's washateria was to coerce payment of that
which defendant claims that plaintiff took from him." 355 So. 2d at 25.
52. See, e.g., Trammell v. Citizens News Co., Inc., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708
(1941)(debt published in newspaper); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927)(creditor posted sign in his shop window); Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81
So. 265 (1919)(posted on blacklist and published in newspaper advertising sale of
accounts receivable); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967)(debt posted
in store).
53. Merely by being made an involuntary participant in a legal proceeding on a
matter of purely private concern, the debtor should not be stripped of his right to
privacy. By analogy to the defamation area, the Court stated in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) that the details of many, if not most, courtroom battles would
add almost nothing toward advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues.
In a few instances, however, the debt can be of public interest, however, depending
on its nature and the parties involved. E.g., Bell v. Courier-Journal and Louisville
Times Co., (Ky.) 402 S.W.2d 84 (1966)(no liability for publishing that a public official
was delinquent on his taxes-not a private debt).
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case should be limited by important differences in the nature
of the disclosure. Defendant did not post the private debt but
rather an account of the theft and subsequent conviction, with
captions, pictures, and the plaintiff's name and current ad-
dress.5' The public has a legitimate interest in the administra-
tion of its criminal justice system, and the information dis-
played was, for the most part, a matter of public record. In Cox
Broadcasting the Court stated that information in the public
records is presumed to be of public interest.55 Under general
tort theory, liability should not arise from the public disclosure
of a fact on the public records because such a fact has lost its
private nature." It follows then that had a newspaper pub-
lished an account of the incident shortly after its occurrence,
liability could not be imposed consistently with either general
tort theory or first amendment requirements.
In Norris the majority skirted the defendant's constitu-
tional challenge by finding inapplicable those cases in which
the publicity was given by the news media. While valid distinc-
tions can perhaps be drawn between media and non-media
defendants, the majority overstated its position. It is at best
unsettled whether the media have any greater rights than the
ordinary citizen. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti7 stated that
"[t]he Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press
Clause confers upon the 'institutional press' any freedom from
government restraint not enjoyed by all others."" The Chief
Justice indicated that no special status was meant to be con-
ferred on a limited group, and the press clause merited special
mention only because the press was more often the object of
official restraints. Free speech protects expression itself while
free press protects the scope of dissemination of that expres-
54. 355 So. 2d at 22.
55. Cox Broadcasting, Inc. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
56. For example, the name of the rape victim in Cox Broadcasting was found to
have been placed in the public domain. Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308, 311 (1977).
57. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
58. Id. at 798.
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sion." It seems well settled that the press has no greater right
of access to information than does the general public.60 To the
extent that the same interests in free speech are implicated, the
distinction between media and non-media defendants appears
unsound." The defendant's constitutional argument was
squarely posed and should have been squarely addressed.
If one assumes that an individual's free speech rights are
equal to those of the media, the question remains whether Mr.
King abused his right. There is some validity to the position
which the trial court and the majority took-that fifteen
months of continued publicity effectively exhausted any public
interest the disclosure may have initially furthered.2 By anal-
ogy to the defamation area,63 excessive publicity might be seen
as an abuse of whatever privilege the defendant originally had.
Even the dissenting judge agreed that the defendant should not
be permitted to leave the bulletin board up indefinitely, but
felt that it had not been displayed for an unreasonable length
of time.64
The position of the majority on the unreasonable duration
of the exposure was weakened by its reliance on Briscoe v.
59. Id. at 799-800. But see Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L.
REv. 731 (1977); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What
Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAST. L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, "Or of the
Press," 26 HAST. L.J. 631 (1975).
60. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) ("The First Amendment gener-
ally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general
public."); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972)(dictum)(no right of
special access to information not available to the public generally); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 589 (1965)(Harlan, J., concurring).
61. It is doubtful that Cox Broadcasting is relevant only to instances in which
the media is involved. In the related defamation area, the cases have not indicated that
any different treatment of non-media defendants is appropriate. See, e.g., St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)(same standard applied to non-media defendant);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)(no media litigants involved though same
standard applied); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(four clergy-
men joined as co-defendants).
62. 355 So. 2d at 24. Abuse often arises when the use or purpose exceeds the
permission given. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610
(1969).
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 604 (1977).
64. 355 So. 2d at 32-33 (Hood, J., dissenting).
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Reader's Digest Association, Inc.." In that case, the defen-
dant's article included a reference to the plaintiffs conviction
for truck hijacking without specifying that the crime occurred
eleven years earlier. In the long lapse of time since the crime,
the plaintiff had established a new and productive life which
was adversely affected by this new exposure. The California
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action for the invasion of his right to privacy and remanded the
case with a specific test for the trial court to apply." Briscoe is
distinguishable from the instant case in that the plaintiff in
Briscoe was placed in a false light; he was not a recent felon,
but a rehabilitated member of society. Further, no ill motives
prompted the publicity by the defendant in Briscoe; the issue
there was an excessive lapse of time, not an excessive duration
of the publicity. Even had the facts more closely resembled
those in Norris, Briscoe represented the minority position at
the time it was decided and may be out of line with the later
case of Cox Broadcasting."7
The majority's position may be supportable even under
Cox because the manner of disclosure, in addition to its exces-
sive duration, may have been objectionable. The information
on the bulletin board was not confined to a "bald recitation""
of the facts on the public record. The privilege to give publicity
to an incident is circumscribed by what a member of the public
could view for himself in the records. The wording of the cap-
tions inserted in the display held the plaintiff up to public
65. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
66. Id. at 538, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
67. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (held a charge of
criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time and place, can never be irrelevant to
an official's or candidate's fitness for office); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1940) (brief biographical sketch of former child prodigy published many
years after his public acclaim had faded); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129
F. Supp. 817, 828 (D.C.D.C. 1955) ("Persons formerly public, however, cannot be
protected against disclosure and re-disclosure of known facts through the reading of
old newspaper accounts and other publications .... "); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co.,
56 Del. 67, 71, 189 A.2d 773, 775 (1963) ("But we do not agree that the lapse of time,
in itself, recreates, or reinstates, a plaintiff's right of privacy. ... ); Rawlins v.
Hutchinson Pub. Co., 218 Kan. 295, 304, 543 P.2d 988, 995 (1975)(the court read Cox
Broadcasting as dictating a different result from Briscoe).
68. Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 528, 541, 154 A.2d 422, 430 (1959).
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ridicule." Intentionally inflicted distress is qualitatively dis-
tinct from harm incidental to a mere disclosure, and to the
degree present, may have properly led to a finding of abuse of
the privilege to speak.
On the other hand, the Norris defendant made a forceful
argument, accepted by the dissenting judge, that his purpose
in displaying the information was solely to deter crime.70 At
least thirty-six thefts had been committed in the defendant's
washateria in the four years prior to the incident involving the
plaintiff." A hidden security camera had been installed, but
had failed to significantly reduce thefts. After the display was
erected, no more thefts were reported.72 Not only was the defen-
dant's property safeguarded, but the safety of his patrons was
increased. Assuming, however, that the defendant was truly
interested only in deterrence of crime in his washateria, it is
arguable that a display which did not reveal the plaintiff's
identity would have been just as effective. Changing real ac-
tors' names and shading photographs have inclined various
courts to view a defendant's actions as more reasonable.73 The
majority interpreted the defendant's failure to use less intru-
sive methods as evidence of his motive to coerce.74
Norris could not complain that his reputation in the com-
munity was damaged by the defendant's disclosures, for in-
deed, the gist of the information was accurate and a matter of
public record. However, the Constitution does not give the de-
fendant a bludgeon of truth with which to inflict incessant
distress upon an admitted thief. Neither the trial judge, major-
69. 355 So. 2d at 25. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 832 (any comments or
headlines added are not privileged unless they fairly reflect the gist of the text). Cf.
Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd., 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973)(plaintiff photographed
at a newsworthy event, but the film was edited to achieve a comic effect at the
plaintiffs expense-servicing portable latrine at Woodstock festival).
70. 355 So. 2d at 30.
71. Id. at 26.
72. Id. at 29.
73. See, e.g., Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966) (documentary
film of prisoners in which identities not revealed and faces shaded); Bernstein v.
National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.C.D.C. 1955) (plaintiff's real name
not revealed).
74. 355 So. 2d at 23.
1224 [Vol. 39
ity, nor dissenting judge objected to an injunction being im-
posed. 5 The plaintiff in the instant case was only eighteen
years old, had served his probationary sentence, and recently
had married. He had obtained a job, and his employer had
requested that the defendant remove the display."5 The plain-
tiff's ability to become a productive member of society and
society's interest in the rehabilitative process were impeded by
this continued exposure."
This case demonstrates the difficulty of regulating the ex-
tent to which a person may speak the truth when such speech
causes another great distress. The strong competing interests
of privacy and free speech defy easy accomodation. The major-
ity eased its task of balancing these interests by improperly
stressing the distinction between an individual's and the
media's right to disseminate information. However, given the
majority's finding that the defendant was motivated by a de-
sire to harass the plaintiff, this writer believes the defendant's
actions were sanctioned consistently with the Constitution.
Rick Revels
Bellotti-CORPORATIONS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH
First National Bank of Boston, I seeking a declaratory judg-
ment, challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts stat-
ute' prohibiting corporations from making political contribu-
75. Id. at 24, 26, 33. The court did not mention that an injunction is generally
an inappropriate remedy to restrain torts such as defamation or harassment against
the person, nor attempt to justify its action by the finding of special circumstances
and irreparable injury. See Greenberg v. Burglass, 254 La. 1019, 1027, 229 So. 2d 83,
86 (1969). See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3601.
76. 355 So. 2d at 29.
77. See, e.g., Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 828
(D.C.D.C. 1955); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 538, 483 P.2d
34, 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 872 (1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 287, 297 P.
91, 93 (1931).
1. The other plaintiffs joining First National Bank of Boston in suing were: New
England Merchants National Bank, the Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp., and
Wyman-Gordon Co.
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West 1977), provides, inter alia:
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